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Electricity transmission: an overview of the current debate 
 
Gert Brunekreeft, Karsten Neuhoff and David Newbery1,2 
08 November 2004 
University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DE 
 
Abstract: Electricity transmission has emerged as critical for successfully liberalising power 
markets. This paper surveys the issues currently under discussion and provides a framework 
for the remaining papers in this issue. We conclude that signalling the efficient location of 
generation investment might require even a competitive LMP system to be complemented 
with deep connection charges. Although a Europe-wide LMP system is desirable, it appears 
politically problematic, so an integrated system of market coupling, possibly evolving by 
voluntary participation, should have high priority. Merchant investors may be able to increase 
interconnector capacity, although this is not unproblematic and raises new regulatory issues. 
A key issue that needs further research is how to better incentivize TSOs, especially with 
respect to cross-border issues.  
 
JEL classification: Electricity, Transmission, Regulation, Prices, Merchant Investment. 
Keywords: L4, L5, L94 
 
 
If the European Single Market is to be extended effectively to the electricity supply industry, 
then EU member states will need (amongst other issues) to make better use of transmission 
capacity, particularly interconnector capacity, to facilitate cross-border trade. At present 
international exchanges of electricity are less than 10% of total production in the old EU-15, 
and the poor correlation of spot prices between many neighbouring countries suggests that 
the national electricity markets are for the most part poorly integrated. This suggests either 
that cross-border flows are inefficiently impeded by the management of the existing 
interconnectors, or that there is insufficient interconnector capacity to allow price 
equalisation. Insufficient interconnector capacity may in turn result from a failure to 
undertake efficient investment in additional capacity, or because the expansion costs exceed 
the arbitrage benefits from unimpeded trade. More generally, market liberalisation allows 
consumers to choose their supplier, and hence would in a competitive market result in the 
cost-effective dispatch of existing generation capacity on a European scale. The growth in 
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intermittent generation makes closer European co-ordination more important. Wind power in 
particular creates new flow patterns across grids, which were primarily designed to provide 
secure supplies to moderately self-sufficient countries and are not optimally designed and 
controlled to handle these and other market-driven patterns. The same is true in the US, 
where decades of under-investment in transmission has revealed a system in stress just as the 
demand for more market-responsive electricity trading requires more capacity to interconnect 
regions under different Transmission Systems Operators (TSOs). 
In response to the needs of liberalised markets and the stresses in transmission 
systems revealed by a series of high profile blackouts in the US and Europe, various bodies 
are now grappling with the problem of how to improve the operation and extension of the 
transmission network. In the US, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, 
pursued the implementation of a Standard Market Design and encouraging larger Regional 
Transmission Organisations to facilitate efficient trade over wider areas and transmission 
investment. In Europe, under prompting from the European Commission, the European TSOs 
are engaged in the Florence Process to develop rules for the better management of 
interconnectors and cross-border trade. The European Commission released a Regulation on 
cross-border exchange in 20033, which addresses these topics, although as we shall argue 
below, not completely satisfactorily. 
In addition to these more visible inter-TSO issues of cross-border trade, investment, and the 
management of security, within each TSO’s jurisdiction the transmission network is called on 
to perform an increasing role in supporting an effectively competitive power market. Both 
cross-border and internal transmission management demands raise a whole set of highly 
complex issues of both academic interest and policy relevance. The Cambridge-MIT-Institute 
Electricity Project held a two-day workshop in Cambridge, England in July 2003 to explore 
some of these issues, to delineate the present state of knowledge, and to identify important 
questions still remaining. This special issue of Utilities Policy provides a selection of papers 
reflecting discussions at that workshop. This paper gives an overview of the current debate, 
summarizing the discussions and indirectly introducing the remaining contributions. 
Inevitably, the selection of issues is incomplete. It reflects what the participants of the 
transmission workshop considered to be the currently leading issues, and does not pretend to 
be exhaustive. We have tried to organize a large set of questions into a small number of 
overarching issues, set out in this overview paper. First, there is the important question 
whether locational marginal pricing (LMP) sets efficient long-term investment signals to 
generators and load, or whether additional locational differentiation of grid charges is 
necessary. This is discussed at length in section 1 below, and underlies part of the 
contributions of Boucher & Smeers and Perez-Arriaga & Olmos, since these deal with the 
pricing of (cross-border) transmission.  
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Second, and currently subject to intense European debate, the papers discuss 
congestion management and ask whether market coupling (also called market splitting) 
would be a workable model for Europe. The alternative, favoured by some parties, is a move 
towards increasingly refined coordinated auctions to manage cross-border trade within 
Europe. This is discussed in general terms in section 3, and examined in more detail in 
Boucher & Smeers, Perez-Arriaga & Olmos and Neuhoff & Newbery.  
Third, the discussion on investment in transmission networks concentrates on the 
prospects and problems of merchant transmission investment. There is still active debate 
about their relative merits compared with regulated transmission investment, while the 
question of how they and regulated links should be regulated is the subject of the 2003 EU 
Regulation on cross-border exchange. While section 4 summarizes the main arguments for 
and against merchant transmission investment, Brunekreeft examines in detail the regulatory 
issues that emerge if merchant transmission investment takes place.  
Fourth, the challenges of efficient network expansion and operation (including losses, 
congestion and balancing) imply the importance of understanding and designing incentive 
mechanisms for the system operator. One would like to avoid a system that provides perverse 
incentives for the operator to increase rather than decrease costs. Our understanding of these 
issues is still underdeveloped and deals more with what is wrong than how to solve the 
problem. Glachant & Pignon provide an insightful study of perverse incentives facing the 
Nordic TSOs, while Joskow summarizes experience and new developments in the US. 
The reader should be aware of a institutional difference between the European and US 
situations, which is reflected in the paper. Throughout the paper we use the term transmission 
system operator “TSO” unless stated otherwise. Unfortunately, the name TSO is not 
unambiguous. A TSO comprises two parts: a transmission owner, TO, and a system operator, 
SO. These functions can be combined, as is usually the case in Europe, but can also be split, 
which is a trend in the US. Where the paper explicitly refers to the split (in a predominantly 
US context), we will use the term ISO (independent system operator) distinct from TO. An 
ISO is often the simplest solution to creating a wider market area without forcing the merger 
of the different grids into a single company. 
 
1. Locational signals 
 
The transmission network is a natural monopoly whose charges must be regulated. In 
an unbundled industry in which generators and consumers react to market signals the 
structure of network charges will have a potentially significant impact on network use and its 
development. It will affect the locational choices of new generation (and of energy intensive 
users), as well as influencing the bidding behavior of generators, and the willingness of 
neighboring electricity markets to trade and cooperate. Clearly, then, setting these charges at 
the right level is critical for ensuring the efficient use and development of the network and the 
wider electricity market. It is also one of the most challenging and difficult problems facing 
regulators. Ideally the structure of network charges should encourage: 
• the efficient short-run use of the network (dispatch order and congestion management); 
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• efficient investment in expanding the network; 
• efficient signals to guide investment decisions by generation and load (where and at what 
scale to locate and with what choice of technology – base-load, peaking, etc.); 
• fairness and political feasibility; and 
• cost-recovery. 
Implementing an efficient scheme may require some political flexibility and 
compromise, as  price changes typically create losers as well as gainers. The changes might 
reduce the profits of some private companies and/or a loss of power of some institutions 
(such as a former TSO within a larger dispatch area).  
 
1.1 LMPs and deep connection charges4 
For short-run optimal use of the network the benchmark is locational marginal pricing 
(LMP), also known as nodal spot pricing or a fully co-ordinated implicit auction. To achieve 
efficiency this requires that generators submit efficiently priced bids (i.e. a schedule of short-
run marginal cost, SRMC, up to full capacity). The dispatch algorithm can then determine the 
efficient dispatch and the associated nodal shadow prices (which, if generators cannot 
increase output, can considerably exceed short-run marginal cost). Both generation and load 
would face these locational prices, although there would need to be additional grid 
connection charges to recover the balance of the regulated costs. If the bids are not set equal 
to marginal cost, scheduled flow patterns will be distorted. However, given that LMP results 
in a flexible allocation of transmission capacity and thereby creates the strongest net-demand 
response, it tends to mitigate the market power exercise of strategic generators more than 
other designs and hence distortions should be smaller than with other designs. 
The concepts of efficient pricing have been developed in Bohn, Caramanis & 
Schweppe (1984), Read & Sell (1989) and the seminal contribution of Hogan (1992). 
Meanwhile, the LMP approach has been (or will soon be) implemented in some variation in 
several states in the US (e.g. PJM, New York, New England, Texas and California) and is a 
cornerstone of FERC’s proposed Standard Market Design. 
 For short-run congestion management there is agreement that a system relying on 
LMPs works and is efficient (provided that bids are competitive). The more challenging 
question concerns the long-run effects of nodal pricing. The question whether differences 
between LMPs serve as the correct basis for rewarding new (merchant) transmission 
investment (i.e. the line owner) will be discussed in section 4. Here we discuss the question 
how (and how well) the LMPs work in giving investment signals for generation and load (i.e. 
the network users).  
The question is closely related to the question whether LMPs recover all the costs of 
the network. If the LMPs recover all network costs then the LMPs unambiguously set the 
efficient investment signals for generation and load. In the long run, with optimal investment, 
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the difference between LMPs would reflect marginal network expansion costs. Unfortunately, 
for various reasons LMP do not recover all costs. Simulations suggest that even with optimal 
investment in generation and transmission long-run economies of scale allow only about 20-
30% cost recovery (e.g. Perez-Arriaga et. al., 1995).  
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Figure 1: Cost drivers of a transmission network 
Source: Perez-Arriaga, 2003 
 
The various causes creating the wedge between LMP revenue and total network cost 
are illustrated in figure 1. Some of these sources of shortfall arise from a failure to properly 
charge for other attributes of the transmission system, many of which are quasi-public goods 
such as reliability. Others follow from the traditional reasons why SRMC pricing falls short 
of full cost recovery, such as economies of scale and lumpiness in expanding both generation 
and transmission to deliver the same standard of reliability. Offsetting this to some extent, 
properly charging for the marginal cost of losses (which are twice the average cost) will make 
a modest net contribution to system revenue (equal to the average cost of the losses). Losses 
can be significant compared to congestion charges, and estimates suggest that the total loss 
factor of moving power from a distant source to a load can be 20-30% (of the average cost of 
the power moved). Thus in New York State, the loss of moving power from the western part 
to New York City can be 20% or more and in the Western part of the US, where distances are 
longer, the loss factor can be 25-35% (Liu and Zobian, 2002). 
Finally, as the costs of black-outs caused by inadequate transmission are very high, 
and the costs of somewhat over-building the network are rather modest, those charged with 
ensuring reliable supplies are likely to err on the side of too much rather than too little spare 
capacity. This further depresses the scarcity value of the network, lowering the dispersion of 
LMPs and hindering cost recovery (although it has an additional benefit in increasing the 
effective size of the market within which each generator bids, and hence reduces market 
power). 
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It follows that cost recovery requires a supplementary pricing scheme, either demand-
based such as Ramsey pricing, or by deep connection charges, and/or a two-part pricing 
scheme. The question is, should these additional elements be locationally differentiated? If 
so, then LMPs do not provide all the relevant long-run locational signals, but if not, then 
LMPs are efficient short-run prices and the remaining problem is purely one of cost-recovery. 
The natural approach is to draw on the standard model of competitive pricing, which 
states that an efficient equilibrium can be supported by a complete set of competitive prices if 
production sets are convex (i.e. there are no economies of scale and all externalities and 
public goods are also properly priced). If, as is the case with the network, parts of the 
production set are not convex, provided that the output decisions of the non-convex part are 
efficiently chosen (e.g. by a central planner or TSO), the remaining production decisions can 
be decentralized by the competitive prices, and one can also associate efficiency prices with 
the non-convex production decisions. (The distinction is that these efficiency prices would 
not guide profit-maximizing agents to the efficient non-convex production point and in that 
sense would not be competitive prices.) 
The first point to note is that some of the problems identified in figure 1 are problems 
of non-convexity, but some may arise from not properly pricing reliability (and the resulting 
risks of blackouts). The question is whether an optimal reliability-constrained dispatch, 
where reliability includes all the relevant risks of line failure and generator outage, is 
accurately priced and included in the nodal prices (together with the cost of ancillary services 
such as spinning reserve at each location where it is required).5 If so, then we can apply the 
competitive theorems. If not, then there will need to be additional charges. If it is possible to 
properly value the impact of any additional generation (G) or load (L) at any node on system 
reliability, then these charges on G and L should be included to give the proper nodal prices 
for analysis. 
 
1.2 The central planned benchmark 
Assume that the network is (centrally) planned, and the TSO accurately forecasts the 
(optimal) sequence of generation and network investments into the future. At each date, given 
accurate forecasts of load (amounts and location, which may depend on the evolution of 
nodal prices), the optimal dispatch is computed and nodal prices derived. In this case, LMPs 
do reflect the marginal costs of the network (irrespective of fixed infrastructure costs). The 
standard theories of competitive pricing imply that a complete set of prices (for each location 
at each time and date) will give efficient investment signals for generation (and load) 
provided these do not experience economies of scale. Investors will make their location and 
plant choices based on the present value of selling at current and future nodal prices (see 
O’Neill, 2003). 
If there are economies of scale in generation there may be problems of coordinating 
the size and location of generation and transmission investments. In the EU and US, though, 
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the optimal scale of generation plant is small compared with existing demand. Combined 
cycle gas turbines (CCGT) reach minimum economic scale in the range 50-350 MW, 
compared to typical system peak demands of 20-50,000 MW. The likely costs of mistakes 
(the wrong size at the wrong place) should therefore be small, although the extra transmission 
costs of mistaken G investment decisions could be significant. That is a possible subject for 
further research through simulating possible system evolution paths and comparing their 
costs and whether, given the price signals, generators are indeed led to locate efficiently 
(Baldick & Kahn, 1993).6  
If these problems of coordination are indeed unimportant (and in any case where there 
are no economies of scale in G) then any additional cost-recovering charges need not be 
locationally differentiated, considerably simplifying their determination. While this appears 
to be a useful benchmark, it remains to check whether the discrepancy between our strong 
assumptions (perfect foresight, competitive pricing of generation) and reality are serious 
enough to invalidate the claim that the only spatial differentiation should come from the 
short-run nodal prices. 
 
1.3 Problems with the benchmark nodal price solution - uncertainty 
There are a number of sources of possible distortion to efficient decision-making based on 
these prices. The first is that future LMPs are not known and may be hard to predict. 
Investors deciding where to locate new generation based on current LMPs may choose the 
wrong location. Given the lumpiness of transmission investment large deviations of current 
LMPs from their long run equilibrium value can be expected. Of course, future electricity 
prices are also unknown, and may be very volatile on an hourly, seasonal and annual basis. 
The standard solution to the volatility of wholesale prices is a contract between buyers and 
sellers. When wholesale prices are high, sellers gain but buyers lose, and vice versa when 
wholesale prices are low. Each party reduces its risk by signing a contract, and the basic 
wholesale contract is a contract for differences (CfD). This specifies a strike price, s, a market 
price, usually a spot price in a formal wholesale market, p, and an amount, M. The generator 
receives the spot price, p, from the wholesale market, and (s – p)M from the counterparty to 
the CfD. If the generator sells M in the spot market, his revenue is completely pre-determined 
at sM, and correspondingly for the buyer. The CfD will need to define the location where the 
wholesale price is set (a National Balancing Point, or Pool Price, or swing bus). A generator 
located at some other node will face a nodal price that may differ substantially from the price 
specified in the CfD, and will continue to be exposed to risk (often called basis risk).  
The solution is an additional contract, a Financial Transmission Right or FTR (also 
called Tradable Congestion Contract, or TCC), that pays the holder p – pn per unit at node n. 
If the generator holds M TCCs at node n and a CfD for M, and generates M, then his revenue 
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will again be sM. The prices of the contracts may be positive or negative, depending on the 
strike prices and the forecast underlying prices, but will be known at the time of entering the 
contract, eliminating price risk. 
The logical solution to the problem of the unpredictability of future nodal prices is for 
the TSO to offer a long-term FTR to the reference node (where energy is priced and traded). 
Its price (or value) is the present value of the predicted shortfall of nodal prices at that 
location relative to the reference node over the life of the investment. (In practice this would 
be issued as a debt instrument that could be liquidated at a constant yearly rate over the 
contract life.) 
 
1.4 Commitment problems 
The second problem is that the TSO may find it difficult to commit to its transmission 
expansion schedule regardless of generator decisions. Thus the least-cost expansion plan may 
involve generators investing inside an import-constrained zone, where competition may then 
become rather intense. A company may prefer to locate instead in an export-constrained 
zone, predicting that the TSO will have to invest in extra transmission. Once the generator 
has made its decision, the least-cost way for the TSO to fulfill its license obligations to 
deliver security of supply and adequate capacity may be to expand transmission capacity. 
This combination of the G and T investment would be more expensive than the least-cost 
expansion plan, but given the G investment, might be socially preferable to not investing in 
transmission. If the TSO had been able to commit to not investing in additional transmission, 
the low prices in the export-constrained zone might have deterred the generator from its 
investment and encouraged the least-cost solution. 
This problem suggests the attractions of deeper (and hence spatially variable) grid 
connection charges for new G. In exchange the new G would receive a FTR. The effect 
should be that the TSO can use FTRs to commit to future nodal prices and hence can 
effectively deter inefficient locational decisions. This is not an additional spatial 
differentiation charge on top of the LMPs but merely a contract for those LMPs. 
There is a related issue that falls part-way between uncertainty and the problem of 
predicting regulatory actions and the consequent nodal prices. Joskow and Tirole (2004) 
show that the relationship between efficient prices and optimal prices during reserve 
deficiencies are extremely sensitive to discretionary actions by the TSO, and to that extent 
hard to predict. Again the solution would seem to be for the TSO to issue FTRs to reduce this 
uncertainty. 
 
1.5 Market power 
The third problem is that in a fully liberalized market, generator market power can distort 
bidding and hence the calculation of nodal prices (which become locational market rather 
than marginal prices). Distorted prices may induce an inefficient pattern of investment. 
Different systems of regulation react to this problem in different ways. The US approach 
which requires regulators to ensure that prices are “just and reasonable” can lead to such 
heavy-handed regulation as requiring generators to submit cost-based bids if their market bids 
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distorts dispatch and pricing beyond specified bounds. A more relaxed approach would 
assume that provided there are no artificial entry barriers, the exercise of market power will 
be self-limiting, inducing competitors to enter at high-priced nodes, and permanently 
reducing future revenues. Since entry at modest scale was economic with gas-fired 
generation, ensuring that entry is contestable was perceived to be sufficient to ensure 
workably efficient outcomes.  
More to the point, if generators hold contracts equal to their planned output, they will 
have no incentive to misrepresent their bids. In a network with transmission constraints this 
requires that generators hold transmission contracts to complement energy contracts with 
counter parties at other locations. Joskow and Tirole (2000) assess how such transmission 
contracts can impact the exercise of market power and Gilbert et.al. (2004) show how auction 
design and restrictions on ownership can reduce the exercise of market power by strategic 
generators. Since generators may choose to contract for hedging reasons, the problem may 
not be too serious, provided shortages (that greatly amplify market power) are not readily 
predicted. Where there are predicted and potentially lengthy shortages (e.g. a systematic 
shortfall in capacity that will require new build that cannot come on stream for some 
considerable time) then market power may spread to the contract market. Price caps on 
contracts are typically far less distorting than on spot markets, and a requirement to offer such 
capped contracts defensible.  
Note that most of the alternatives to LMP are potentially worse at dealing with the 
locational distortions caused by market power. The original English electricity Pool offered a 
single price and firm transmission rights, so that plant that could not be dispatched because of 
constraints would be paid its theoretical lost profit (Pool price less bid) to not generate. A 
generator assured that he is not required and facing little local competition might then bid 
very low to maximize income. It may then pay to locate in an export-constrained zone to 
enjoy these profits, even though this is exactly the wrong place to locate. The counterpart is 
that generation in import-constrained zones can bid high (and be paid its bid price if 
constrained to run out of the unconstrained merit order) and will therefore be more strongly 
motivated to locate in such zones by the presence of market power. 
 
1.6 Pricing for supply security 
A fourth source of potential distortion already noted is a failure to properly value and price 
the impact of investments on security and quality of supply. Joskow and Tirole (2004) 
explore this issue in some depth, and the challenges faced in adapting the old engineering-
based approach to cope with liberalised markets. Typically, and reasonably, given the 
asymmetry in social costs between under- and over-investment, investment standards are set 
conservatively, so there is a tendency to over-invest in security. If the operational standards 
would be equally conservative, requiring the same amount of reserve capacity to satisfy 
security criteria, then the locational price differences would reflect the additional security 
requirement. If, however, the spare capacity required at the investment stage exceeds the 
operational reserve capacity, then the nodal price differences will be reduced and the 
locational signals muted, while at the same time the cost-recovery problem exacerbated.  
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There are several possible solutions. One might be to add an additional locational 
charge for security and quality, if location makes an important difference to either security or 
quality of supply. The second is to make the fixed charge spatially variable to restore the 
price signals for G location. Britain, which has not adopted LMP, has annual zonal charges 
for being connected that give (and are designed to give) quite strong locational signals. This 
is perhaps the most important qualification to the claim that nodal prices provide all the 
locational variation that is required. However, while the annual charges should properly be 
based on capacity (or peak demand), the nodal prices will charge according to energy, and 
these short-run energy price signals should not be distorted by the corrections required to 
signal investment location. 
 
1.7 Deep connection charges 
A related question is how to charge new G where their entry requires expanding and/or 
upgrading the grid (either locally, by a shallow connection, or in some other parts of the 
network by a deep connection upgrade). It is tempting to argue that as LMPs will not recover 
all network costs, so those who cause grid investment should pay the extra cost of that 
investment (through deep connection charges). It is standard practice for G or L to pay for the 
assets required to connect to the nearest suitable grid connection point, and this carries the 
logic beyond that point where reinforcement is required. If so, then it might also be 
reasonable for this charge to take the form of a long-term transmission contract to the 
reference node, transferable to other generators at that node if the generator chooses to 
disconnect. The problem would not arise in the absence of all the other distortions, and the 
relevant distortion here is a combination of not knowing the future evolution of the whole 
system (G, L and T) and the tendency in the presence of uncertainty to err on the side of 
security and overcapacity. 
It is a natural step to argue that as the LMPs do not reflect all network costs, the 
incentives for generation investment may be distorted, because the generator would not bear 
all the costs it causes. If connection charges should reflect cost causation, one is led to 
propose deep connection charges. The principle was adopted in Britain for setting the entry 
and exit prices of the gas National Transmission System, which asked of each entry and exit 
point what would be the additional investment required to support a significant unit increase 
in injections or withdrawals. These costs were then translated (rather crudely) into regulated 
charges, which, however, applied to all requiring entry or exit at that node. The system of 
setting prices for entry was then subsequently replaced by auctions, which are the natural 
counterpart to the electricity system LMPs.7 
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 Auctions for (and subsequent trading in) explicit entry rights seem feasible for some gas networks 
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with daily balancing, rather than minute by minute for electricity. In contrast, physical transmission 
rights for electricity might be too complex to allow for sufficient liquidity for efficient pricing and 
trading. 
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Although deep connection charges appear attractive at first glance, they are not 
unproblematic. Whereas it is possible to reasonably simulate the post-investment situation (as 
in PJM in the US), it is not at all clear what the costs caused by the new connection actually 
are or should be. If, for example, the upgrades take account of indivisibilities to over-build 
ahead of future demand, what fraction of the cost is attributable to the present connection? If 
capacity is typically oversized because of the asymmetry in cost of under or over-building, is 
it reasonable to charge this general security benefit to a new entrant? Finally, and decisively 
in the British case, if there are benefits to encouraging entry to mitigate market power, then 
deep connection charges discriminate against entry (and additional G capacity) and lose some 
of their attraction.  
Shallow charges promote new entry, which may appear attractive to those wishing to 
promote renewables or additional generation capacity to improve security of supply. The 
issue is rapidly gaining relevance with the development of large-scale off-shore wind energy 
in the UK, Denmark and northern Germany. Exactly how such generation should be charged 
has attracted considerable attention in Britain, where NGC has estimated that the grid 
reinforcement costs to handle modest amounts of extra wind power in Scotland might be 
£205-525 million, or 75-85% of the total cost of all new wind power. As the Government 
document notes “Given NGC’s shallow connection charging policy, these costs would not 
form the basis of connection charges, but would rather be additional capital expenditure to be 
recovered from all users through transmission network use-of-system charges (TNUoS).” 
(DTI, 2002, ch 8).   
These charges are derived from a simplified DC investment cost model of a the grid, 
and are spatially differentiated, but are levied on the highest injection declared for the year. 
As such they may not properly reflect the load patterns of wind compared to conventional 
generation, and may not be, as arguably they ought, a fair reflection of the annual implied 
nodal price differences from a reference node. This suggests that the current charging 
methodology overstates the regional access price differences for intermittent wind power. In 
response, there have been suggestions that wind power should face a locationally 
undifferentiated grid charge, but the regulator, Ofgem has correctly argued that this would 
not encourage renewables to locate in the least cost (generation plus transmission costs) 
location. The discussion illustrates that existing transmission charging regimes are typically 
developed for existing technologies, and may require adjustment to provide a technology-
neutral treatment of new technologies.  
To summarise, in the absence of LMP, there is a strong case for a locational element 
to grid charges, and these should be computed to guide location decisions to minimize the 
present discounted cost of all G and T investments required to maintain reliability and 
security standards. The logic of British zonal charges was to roughly reflect the incremental 
cost of transmission investment to support additional generation in each zone in a way that 
was auditable by any potential investor. The latter requirement may have distorted the signals 
from their efficient level, but the gains in transparency and accountability, and the difficulty 
of predicting the relevant efficient charges in an uncertain world, probably outweighed the 
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disadvantages. Of course, the difficulties could be avoided by using LMPs and FTRs, but 
these face one final problem. 
 
1.8 LMPs without a Pool price 
If all generation has to submit bids at each node, then it is straightforward to compute the 
LMPs. The English Electricity Pool could have computed such LMPs from the data 
submitted each day, but was replaced by the New Electricity Trading Arrangements in 2001. 
At that point the pool and compulsory bidding ended, to be replaced by bilateral and OTC 
markets, a voluntary day-ahead power exchange, and a short term Balancing Mechanism to 
elicit bids and offers to balance the system and reconcile constraints. The latter was a pay-as-
bid auction with two imbalance prices (for being short or long) set at the average price of the 
bids or offers accepted. As such the balancing mechanism is ill-suited to producing a single 
set of LMPs, first because it trades only a tiny fraction of output, second, because it lacks a 
single locational marginal price comparable to the day ahead price of LMP, and third, 
because it does not provide sufficient notice about congestion pattern to influence ramping 
decisions. 
The Nordpool and PJM experience shows that LMP (or, more precisely, market 
coupling) works if all parties that are transacting across regional boundaries (or nodes at 
PJM) have to submit bids to the energy spot markets in the respective areas or have to notify 
bilateral transactions whose transmission is charged the day ahead spot-price difference 
between the injection and exit node. Hence all contracting positions are effectively financial 
contracts, which are settled at the spot prices at each region. For these prices to provide full 
hedging, the spot markets have to be cleared by one central algorithm that arbitrages the 
markets subject to the available transmission capacity between the regions.   
 It would therefore seem to follow that LMPs sit most comfortably with a compulsory 
gross pool, although the Nordic market manages dynamic market splitting without a 
compulsory pool.8 That said, NordPool is far more liquid than any other electricity power 
exchange, and there is a well-defined price to use for zonal differentiation.  
 
                                                 
8
  Nordpool uses the term market splitting to deal with the case in which constraints prevent the 
Nordic market clearing at a single price, at which point the market is split into pre-defined zones in 
each of which there is a single market clearing price. In this paper we use the term market coupling to 
cover this case as well, even though the markets that have been combined under a single system 
operator may need to be subdivided into separately priced zones. The full description is given in 
section 3 below. 
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2. Recovering the short-fall in transmission revenue 
 
One very simple way to demonstrate the short-fall between LMP revenue and that 
required for the regulated transmission business is to imagine that each node normally has an 
equal generation and load. As LMP prices would be the same for G and L, there would be no 
net revenue, and the security benefits of interconnecting the nodes would be unrewarded. Of 
course, G and L are most unlikely to be balanced hour by hour, even if their capacities are the 
same, and cheaper G will export, lowering LMPs and producing net revenue. Nevertheless, 
all the evidence suggests a substantial short-fall that will need to be recovered by non-
locational charges, and these will have to introduce a wedge between the G and L charges at 
each node. 
 The regulator will have determined the allowable revenue for the transmission system, 
and hence the size of the shortfall after taking account of LMP revenue and those for 
ancillary and other grid services. The revenue will have to be allocated to capacity (or power) 
of G and L. This immediately raises several questions: does it matter how this wedge is 
allocated between G and L, and on what basis should the G and L charges be set? 
 The first point to note is that in a competitive and isolated system, the proportions 
charged to G and L make no difference, as the final price paid by the consumer will be the G 
cost plus the T charge. If the fraction of the T charge t paid by G is α, and the generator’s 
efficient bid is b then the wholesale price will be b + αt, to which the L will pay an additional 
(1- α)t to give a delivered price of b + t. The appendix shows that this continues to be true even 
if the generators have market power and bid above their efficient price. Clearly, if two 
interconnected systems choose a different allocation there will be distortions. If, for example, 
one system places all the grid charges onto L and the other onto G, then the first system will 
have a comparative advantage selling to customers in the second, unless the interconnector 
levies a suitable charge. Harmonising the G:L balance therefore becomes important in 
interconnected systems, and there is some attraction in levying all the grid charges on 
consumers. However, this requires care in systems without the locational signals contained in 
LMP prices, where the correct interpretation is that the weighted average of G connection 
charges is zero, preserving any locational differentials in G charges that are required. Thus in 
Britain for 2004/5 the annual zonal G tariffs range from £10.7/kW to -£6.8, a range of 
£17.5/kW. This is exactly half the interest and depreciation on a CCGT plant costing £310/kW 
at 10% interest and hence a strong locational signal, which requires some negative G charges.9 
 The next question is to determine the basis on which the charges should be set. 
Ideally, as the charges are effectively taxes to recover the shortfall, they should be minimally 
distorting, and independent of any actions that those connected might take.  With that in 
mind, let us consider the British system as an example. G pays according to Transmission 
Entry Capacity (TEC) connected to the system on April 1 each year, and L pays according to 
demand taken at the “triad” – the three half-hours of system peak demand separated by 10 
                                                 
9
  To ensure that the plant provides useful power when needed, the payment to the plant depends on 
its output at the system peak (strictly, at the triad described in the text). 
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days, an amount that is determined after the event. Both suffer from potential limitations. 
Consider first the question whether an annual fixed charge discourages rarely run peaking 
plant from the (potentially considerable) annual connection charge. It is most likely to be 
required at the triad, in which case consumers will pay the same grid charges regardless of 
how the G charge is allocated over different generators. If, however, the peaking plant pays 
the full G charge, investment in or keeping available of peaking plants requires higher or 
more frequently peaking prices to recover this cost and this will be passed on to consumers. 
The consumer price will be higher and hence demand lower in these periods, and that will 
have some effect on choice. As such it will be distortionary. 
The question of how to set the least-distortionary form of taxation was addressed and 
answered by Ramsey in the 1920s. In its simplest form a Ramsey tax is a mark-up on the 
efficient price inversely proportional to the demand elasticity.10 Ramsey pricing is now 
accepted as the best feasible way of collecting such shortfalls in revenue (at least provided 
the resulting charge does not bear more heavily on the poor than alternatives).11 Stoft (2002, 
p. 413) notes that Ramsey pricing is theoretically optimal but is “complex and controversial and 
will not be pursued.” He argues instead for spreading the charges “as thinly and evenly as 
possible”, but does not say whether this should be proportional to TEC (as in Britain) or output 
(MWh).  
 If an annual grid connection charge for rarely-run plant discourages that plant’s 
availability, then it distorts production decisions and fails the Ramsey test. What is required is a 
cost-recovering charge that is based on the physical characteristics of the plant rather than use 
(e.g. thermal efficiency, fuel, etc. which will determine its merit order) and possibly age (that 
may be correlated with efficiency and hence also merit order). However, such charges are likely 
to distort the choice of plant type and availability decisions. 
It might be objected that uncertainty about future grid charges could discourage 
generation investment. That could be solved by offering a contract for the expected life of the 
station, whose annual payments are specified in advance and are independent of whether or not 
the station continues to operate (or be connected). Apart from the difficulty and costs to obtain 
the required credit guarantees it would still be necessary to differentiate charges according to 
Ramsey principles, in order to persuade investors to install peaking plant, but it would reduce 
the risk of ex post opportunism in resetting the grid charges. 
The case for setting the L charges on the basis of the triad dates back from the period 
when transmission and generation were both provided by the Central Electricity Generation 
Board, which charged a two-part tariff for both generation and transmission capacity (based on 
peak or triad demand) and energy (the system marginal price). It is less clear that the capacity 
element of the grid alone is best measured by the triad demand – indeed some of the heaviest 
uses of the grid arise off-peak when cheap power is wheeled over longer distances to the load. 
Peak-load plant being footloose can usually be located closer to demand. Nevertheless, Ramsey 
                                                 
10
  This is true provided there are zero cross-price elasticities and no externalities, otherwise the 
formula is more complicated. 
11
  Or, correctly, providing the regulator setting the charge is required to set the charges solely on 
efficiency grounds, leaving the tax system to address any distributional concerns. 
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pricing suggests that if demand is less elastic at the peak then grid charges can be concentrated 
there, although it seems unlikely that the ratio of the price elasticity at other times to at the triad 
is almost infinite (which is what would be required to justify loading all the charges on those 
three half-hours). 
To summarise, in an unbundled and liberalised electricity industry, cost-recovering grid 
charges risk distorting choices of plant type and operation. We seem to be some way short of an 
agreed and feasible methodology for such charges, although we are also unclear how serious the 
costs of any potential distortions are. The need to finance grid reinforcements for new wind 
power may encourage more research on this topic. 
  
2.1 Cross-border tarification (CBT) 
A postage stamp is a charge for Use of the System (UoS) which is independent of distance; it 
is a common approach to apply a system of connection fees (energy or capacity based) which 
are not transaction related. The promotion of competition is often argued to justify a postage 
stamp charge for network use, and within a country this may be reasonable if internal 
congestion is minor. The Netherlands justifies such a charge on the grounds that the country 
is a “copper plate” with no internal congestion, although there are clearly some parts where 
only one generation company can deliver power at certain times of the day. In other words, a 
grid which is adequate for a socially optimized dispatch may allow pockets of market power 
that can exploit the potential to congest internal links, and in such cases LMP charges have a 
(possibly minor) beneficial impact on market power. If the postage stamps differ across 
regions they are called license plate fees. 
A major advantage of both systems is that they avoid pancaking the fees of several 
TSO regions involved in a transaction (i.e. stacking each region’s fees on top of each other). 
As such it removes inefficient protection of local generators and thereby promotes 
competition. Pancaking is clearly to be avoided if possible, but it is less clear how to 
efficiently charge for transmission where several networks are interconnected, and how to 
compensate the network owners so that they will be willing to trade and invest. Consider 
countries (and thus networks) A, B and C. If A exports to country C and most of the flow 
goes through country B, then country B is a transit country. Although the trade (from A to C) 
relies on network B, with network costs charged to the generator and final user, A and C do 
not actually pay for the network in B. Horizontal inter-network compensation arrangements 
aim to repair this flaw and are discussed, in the European context, under the header cross-
border tarification, CBT, (and in the US as the “seams issue”). 
 The compensation issue is irrelevant for efficiency as far as sunk costs are involved, 
although if the compensation is based on flow patterns, then it might induce network 
operators to distort power flows from the optimal dispatch. Inter-network compensation 
becomes important whenever it affects investment decisions. In the European example the 
national regulator typically regulates the national network and there is no counterpart to 
FERC, which in the US has jurisdiction over inter-state (and thus inter-TSO) flows. The 
regulator in region B might not support a beneficial network expansion in country B if all the 
costs fall on G and L in B and the consumers and generators benefiting in A and C make no 
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contribution. Furthermore, the details of the compensation rule will affect grid revenues for 
A, B and C and thereby affect the use-of-system (UoS) charges required to make up the 
shortfalls in each area. These may then affect investment decisions for generators and load. 
Whether this is empirically relevant depends on the amount of the compensation payments. 
As long as the design of cross-border compensation payments remains unsettled, it will be 
difficult to justify interconnector investments, as these become sunk and less relevant to 
bargaining over the determination of the payments once made.  
Vázquez, Olmos and Pérez-Arriaga (2002) discuss various schemes for charging 
network users for that (substantial) part of the total cost not recovered from congestion 
charges or charges for losses (which typically make a profit). 
 
2.2 The marginal participation rule or area of influence rule 
The method of marginal participation attempts to estimate how flows respond to a change in 
injection (or withdrawal) of 1 MW at any node, with a view to charging agents at that node their 
share of the costs of the links on which flows change. Boucher & Smeers (2003, p. 20) stress 
the difficulty of the calculations and the arbitrariness of such cost-allocation rules and 
question the efficiency effects in general. Vázquez et. al. (2002) point out that the choice of 
the “slack bus” effectively determines from which node the withdrawal (or injection) of 1 MW 
comes, and hence strongly influences the resulting flows. As a consequence the principle of the 
marginal unit can lead to unreasonable results if the marginal value in a line is significant 
although the “real” flow is negligible (Vázquez et. al., 2002).  
 However, it is important to note that irrespective of the choice of slack bus, if both 
generation and load are exposed to the same locational component, then the net total payment 
for a balanced transmission is not influenced by the choice of the slack bus. The choice of the 
reference bus only determines the allocation of costs between generation and load. Vázquez et. 
al. (2002) demonstrate this conjecture, and their argument is set out in the appendix. 
 There are additional refinements of the marginal participation rule that are likely to be 
even more complicated to compute, even if they are conceptually more satisfactory. 
Logically, any additional injection has to be matched by withdrawals of the same total 
amount (less losses) but not necessarily at a single node (let alone an arbitrary slack bus). 
Conceptually, an increase in power in a competitive system would cause prices to change by 
different amounts at different nodes, and these price changes would stimulate changes in 
generation and consumption adding up to the required amount. The associated set of 
withdrawals would define the marginal changes in power flows and hence the relevant grid 
charges. It then remains to determine the fair amounts to charge for the use of these lines, and 
here we come back to the original problem that efficient pricing of lines leads to under-
recovery, while average charges remove the efficiency justification. 
The obvious objections to the marginal approach are that it is too complicated, 
apparently arbitrary, and likely to either under-reward additional investment, or over-charge 
relative to the efficient solution. That suggests the need for a simpler, defensible rule that 
would be acceptable to the various TSOs who have to reach agreement.  
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2.3 The average participation rule or tracing 
This rule allocates responsibility for the costs of actual flows on various lines from sources to 
sinks according to a simple allocation rule, in which inflows are distributed proportionally 
between the outflows (Vazquez et.al., 2002, p. 5). The main attractions of tracing are that the 
rule has some theoretical backing based on the Shapley value (cf. Kattuman et.al., 2004) and 
does not require the choice of a slack node. The drawbacks of tracing are first that 
aggregation of users can lead to counterintuitive results: If generation and load or different 
nodes are aggregated, then they are exposed to different tariffs. Second, the choice of the 
allocation rule is decisive but apparently arbitrary (apart from the Shapley justification).12 
The marginal participation rule is applied in Argentina (cf. Woolf, 2003, pp. 262 ff.), 
where it works reasonably well because of the predominantly radial system. In Argentina, the 
main load centre is Buenos Aires, which is the slack node, and the power plants are built near 
faraway gas fields. The lines are mainly radial lines from the generation centres to the load 
centre, and thus the allocation of cost is relatively straightforward.  
While this suggests that the choice of mechanism should depend on the nature of the 
network under consideration, in Europe and the US, within-country grids are typically 
densely meshed and the marginal approach is likely to be too complex and contentious. If the 
TSOs can be persuaded of the fairness of the tracing approach, and if it leads to (or can be 
combined with) efficient interconnector investment, then it has a great deal of merit. The first 
step in Europe would seem to be to set up an independent technical group, provide it with all 
the relevant data for the entire European network and the dispatch pattern, to see if they are 
able to identify robust candidates (on social cost-benefit terms) for interconnector investment, 
and to work out the implied patterns of costs and benefits to see if each TSO benefits from 
the set of such investments under the proposed cross-border tariffing rule. While it may be 
too much to expect each individual investment to be Pareto improving, there is more chance 
that this would be true of a large enough set, given the poor current state of interconnector 
capacity. 
 
3. Cross-border congestion management 
 
The TSOs as well as market actors have stated that congestion occurs at least 
occasionally at almost every European border (Haubrich et al., 2001).13 There is general 
agreement that market-based mechanisms are required to allocate scarce transmission 
capacity on congested links. The theoretical optimal solution is nodal pricing, successfully 
                                                 
12
  The Shapley allocation results from the exercise of the bargaining power of the various coalitions 
of countries or regions involved in setting the cost allocation rule, according to some reasonable a 
priori restrictions on how to measure bargaining power and how to divide the gains from cooperation. 
13
 Haubrich et al. (2001) assessed the following corridors: Spain-Portugal, France-Great Britain, 
France-Belgium, France-Germany, Netherlands-Belgium/Germany, Germany-Denmark, Germany-
Sweden, France/Switzerland/Austria(/Slovenia)-Italy, Austria-Switzerland, Austria-Germany, 
Norway-Sweden. But interconnections with central European countries (e.g. Hungary) are also 
frequently constrained. 
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applied in parts of the US East coast.14 However, it requires centralization of system 
responsibility, which is currently perceived as difficult to achieve. System operators are 
responsible for system balance and constraint management of their regional/national network, 
and they argue that only they can provide the required system security. Not surprisingly, they 
want to retain this authority. System operators currently determine bilaterally the amount of 
transmission capacity made available between neighboring countries for commercial 
transactions. If demand exceeds the available capacity, then auctions can be (and often are) 
used to make this capacity available to the market.15  
A shared perception is that the current decentralized auctions of international 
transmission capacity fail to make effective use of a highly meshed and integrated electricity 
network.16 For example, if electricity is transmitted from France to Germany then energy not 
only flows along the direct links between the countries, but also across the interconnector 
from France to Belgium and then via the Netherlands to Germany. Currently the Belgium 
system operator does not receive timely information on German-French flows. He therefore 
has to be conservative in issuing commercial transmission rights, e.g. between France and 
Belgium, because he has to anticipate the largest possible impact the unknown flows from 
France to Germany could have on the network. Most of the times the flows will not have this 
large impact, so the network is underutilized even when there is a scarcity of commercial 
transmission rights between France and Belgium. This could induce the system operator to 
apply less conservative estimates, which could jeopardize system security if large 
transmissions both between France and Germany and France and Belgium coincide. The 
problem is made more difficult as the share of intermittent generation from wind increases, 
where generation can change dramatically on time scales that are short compared to the 
allocation procedure for interconnection capacity. 
Figure 2 illustrates two similar solutions that are suggested to resolve the problem of 
international flows: a coordinated auction for all European interconnector capacity and 
market coupling between European electricity markets.  
The coordinated auction consists of three steps: First, each system operator has to 
inform the central auctioneer about the transmission capacity available for commercial flows 
on its transmission network. Second, market participants submit bids for transmission rights 
between any two countries. Third, the auctioneer allocates available commercial transmission 
capacity to the bidders using an algorithm analogous to nodal pricing. Based on the submitted 
information this offers a well-defined and non-disputable allocation. The auctioneer 
effectively considers the interests of both the bidders for transmission capacity from France 
to Belgium and France to Germany when determining the optimal set of international 
transmission rights he issues. The auction revenue can either be allocated to some sharing 
                                                 
14
 PJM and New England. Note that although PJM has adopted nodal pricing to make better use of the 
transmission system within PJM, this does not solve the problem of trade across the boundaries with 
other TSOs – the so-called “seams” issue, nor does it ensure that efficient interconnector investments 
will be undertaken across these seams. See Joskow (this issue). 
15
 Examples are Germany-Netherlands or UK-France.  See e.g. Newbery and McDaniel (2003). 
16
 ETSO (2001), European Commission (2003), Boucher & Smeers, (2003) 
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rule, or attributed to the individual network constraints according to their scarcity value 
calculated in the auction process. 
 
National/regional system operator
Transmission auctioneer
Market Participant
National/regional power exchange
Declare available capacity
Participation in auction
Decentralised 
auction
Coordinated
auction
Market 
coupling
Nodal 
pricing
 
Figure 2: Different allocation mechanisms for scarce transmission capacity 
 
 The market coupling (sometimes called market splitting) approach works in a similar 
way. Once again, each system operator has to inform the central auctioneer about 
transmission capacity available for commercial flows on the transmission network. However, 
instead of market participants bidding for cross-border rights, this time the national power 
exchanges submit bids to the central auctioneer. Each national power exchange would add all 
bids and offers to create a net demand curve, which is submitted to the central auctioneer. 
The net-demand curve specifies at which price the national market would be balanced (the 
current market clearing price) and what amount of energy would be available for exports at 
higher prices or required from imports at lower prices. Analogous to the coordinated auction 
the system operator uses the typical nodal pricing method to determine the optimal use of the 
commercially available capacity between countries. He issues transmission rights to the 
national power exchanges to implement this solution. The national power exchanges then 
clear the local power exchange given net imports and exports and set the local prices.  The 
revenue the central auctioneer receives from the transmission rights can be used as described 
in the coordinated auction. 
The advantage of market coupling is that energy transmissions are determined after 
generators and demands have submitted their information to national power exchanges. This 
allows for the use of all available information and improves on the efficiency of production 
and allocation decision. For instance Joskow (2003, p. 21) notes that where energy and 
transmission-capacity markets were not integrated (like California and Texas) congestion 
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costs appeared to be too high, making a case in favor of integration. Neuhoff (2003) uses the 
explicit auction between Germany and the Netherlands and the market coupling between 
Sweden and Northern Norway for a test that agrees with the hypothesis that explicit auctions 
allow for more exercise of market power because generators face lower effective demand 
elasticities. In a numerical model of the meshed network of the Benelux countries, France and 
Germany, Ehrenmann et.al. (2003) show that market coupling would reduce prices relative to 
a coordinated auction of interconnectors. A potential additional benefit of market coupling is 
that all transmission allocation is firm so that counter-flows allow an effective use of the 
network. This is also possible if physical transmission rights are formulated as obligations, 
but currently their implementation makes them look more like options than obligations and it 
is unclear whether this situation will change. Options reduce the amount of capacity that can 
be safely allocated relative to obligations which can offset other flows. 
 Both proposals for coordinated auctions and for market coupling currently discussed 
in Europe rely on the assumption that congestion is an international issue and ignore 
congestion within countries. Creating only zonal prices (Sweden) or facilitating bilateral 
contracting by ignoring transmission constraints in the energy market (as in UK) creates 
perverse incentives for the location of new generation, as noted above. Thus a generator in 
the frequently export-constrained North of Sweden/UK first gets the national energy price, 
and then further profits in the balancing market when his re-dispatch bid is accepted by the 
SO that has to resolve constraints. The lack of explicit congestion treatment thus gives the 
wrong investment signals (Neuhoff, 2002). In addition generators may bid strategically to 
create congestion, as occurred in the US with zonal pricing, but it would equally apply to 
coordinated auctions. 
Another way to describe the relative merits of market coupling over coordinated 
auctions is that because all markets are cleared simultaneously, the auctioneer can make more 
transmission available and hence reduces the extent to which individual generators are able to 
exploit congestion constraints, which fragment markets and increase volatility. Harvey and 
Hogan (2003) address the question of whether to subdivide zones to address internal 
congestion. They show that the impact of market power is weakly smaller if zones are split 
up instead of using the system operator to re-dispatch generation to resolve the constraint and 
maintain a single price. Splitting up zones in an explicit auction design requires that any 
transaction between the subzones is exactly matched by corresponding physical transmission 
contracts, increasing contract complexity and reducing liquidity. With market coupling 
subdividing zones is less critical. First, financial transmission contracts would only be 
required if the risk of price differences is perceived to be significant. Secondly, financial 
transmission contracts between the subzones could be defined over longer periods, as most of 
the price risk can be hedged even if not every energy transaction is exactly matched by 
transmission contracts. This suggests that market coupling is preferable. 
Finally, from the perspective of market participants financial transmission contracts 
offer the same services that they would expect from physical transmission contracts. Assume 
a German generator sells to a Dutch industrial load and the price difference is hedged with a 
transmission contract. How will they subsequently use the contract? If they own a physical 
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transmission contract, they will nominate the generation and exports in Germany, present the 
transmission contract, and nominate the imports and demand in the Netherlands. With a 
financial transmission contract, they will offer generation at any price in Germany and the bid 
for the corresponding load at any price in the Netherlands. They will be exposed to the price 
difference of the two markets, which is exactly covered by the financial transmission 
contract. They can actually improve on this with financial contracts, as bidding avoidable 
cost for generation allows a cost saving if the market-clearing price in Germany is below the 
avoidable cost, for the load will still be served in the Netherlands. 
 
3.1 Implementation  
Why are European governments not willing to implement nodal spot pricing (or the 
simplified version of market coupling) as the logical congestion management scheme? Pérez-
Arriaga & Olmos (this issue) argue that the number of control areas in Europe (17 to 27 
depending on where the borders are drawn) is significantly smaller than in the US with some 
200. This may reduce the need for a single integrated solution in Europe. Moreover, as the 
control areas are larger and their boundaries tend to coincide with country borders, the 
European member states may have a stronger political voice than the states in the US (though 
see Joskow’s article in this issue for a more pessimistic view on the US).  Lastly, because the 
interconnections between control areas are the ‘weak links’ of most transmission systems, the 
large number of control areas in the US resulted in larger benefits to efficient congestion 
management.  
Apart from this political constraint the previous arguments all seem to favor market 
coupling rather than a coordinated auctions for transmission capacity. However, the 
implementation of market coupling requires the coordination of a large group of stakeholders. 
Initially TSOs were concerned about the implications for security of supply of market 
coupling. Now it is acknowledged that market coupling allows TSOs to retain the same 
operational autonomy to ensure security of supply. Organizations involved in energy trading 
might prefer auctions, as they provide trading opportunities and the uncertainty involved 
increases trading margins. However, firms (among them TSOs) interested in merchant 
transmission investment and generation companies considering the location of new 
investments are affected by the likely instability of future regulation if an unsatisfactory 
market design (such as coordinated auctions) is implemented. Moving towards the most 
efficient solution thus reduces regulatory risk. 
Given that a full European nodal approach is currently some distance from political 
reality, could an incremental approach via regional market coupling be pursued? Could 
market coupling be introduced into smaller areas and then gradually extended e.g. starting 
with the Benelux and then extending to neighboring countries? This might require that most 
expansions are Pareto improvements for the relevant decision groups. Neuhoff (2003) shows 
that coupling of the Belgian and Dutch markets should not increase prices on either side if the 
same constraints on the exercise of monopoly remained after market coupling is 
implemented. This is, however, a strong assumption, discussed by Neuhoff and Newbery in 
this issue. 
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Many of the principles set out in the FERC SMD are economically sensible17 and 
where implemented could provide lessons for Europe, particularly if their experience 
demonstrates the superiority of a market design that could be lends itself to replicated in 
Europe and is compatible with efficient market integration. The main concern is to avoid 
choices in the short run that make it difficult to move towards an efficient system of cross-
European pricing and use of the full interconnection capacity. 
 
4. Merchant transmission investment 
 
Merchant (also called market-based) transmission investment is a relatively new 
development currently under discussion in many parts of the world. Merchant transmission 
investment refers to investment in transmission facilities remunerated by arbitrage between 
differently priced regions. Such merchant investment is not eligible for regulated network 
connection and UoS charges. The US and Australia already have some experience, and 
several possible merchant lines are under active discussion in Europe. 
Apart from the well-known arguments for allowing market forces to operate where 
possible, there are three quite specific arguments for allowing merchant transmission 
investment. First, vertically integrated utilities have poor incentives to invest in 
interconnector capacities, because they increase the competition facing their own generation 
markets. Second, regulatory uncertainty impedes investment by regulated private 
transmission companies. Gans & King (2003) quote a discussion of the Australian 
Productivity Commission on “regulation holidays” for risky new significant investment. The 
argument is that a regulator cannot credibly commit to “allow high profits” if ex post the state 
of the world turns out to be good, but will happily allow the company to suffer any losses.18 
Hence, given uncertainty, the ex ante expected rate of return will be lowered, depressing 
investment. In the discussion in Australia, a commitment to refrain from regulation for a 
predetermined number of years is seen as a possible way out, opening the option of merchant 
investment.  
The third argument is a public-choice argument. If permission to build a line is 
required on the two ends of an interconnector, the authorities would each need to be 
convinced that the extra charges need to finance a regulated investment can be justified on 
cost-benefit criteria as benefiting their jurisdiction. Merchant transmission investment 
mitigates this problem because it does not require such a cost-benefit test (although regulators 
may still deny interconnection if they believe it reduces social welfare in their own 
jurisdiction). The key argument is that the requirement of economic approval allows other 
goals to enter the discussion or can easily be abused. 
 It is important to distinguish carefully between the developments in the US on the one 
hand and Europe and Australia on the other. The nodal pricing approach in the US allows a 
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 Although many have been criticised and may not be politically feasible. 
18
  A similar problem arises in the US where investment must be “prudent” and “used and useful” to 
qualify for receiving regulated revenues, but in that case it only earns the normal rate of return. 
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more refined merchant system with incremental Financial Transmission Rights, FTRs19 than 
the zonal approaches in Europe and Australia. A properly chosen set of point-to-point 
incremental FTRs can internalize network effects caused by the loop flows of the new 
investment (cf. Hogan, 2003 and Kristiansen & Rosellón, 2003). However, such schemes 
create considerable complexity in their implementation, because they require the allocation of 
residual rights created by the merchant investment. This requires several years of multi-round 
auctions to identify the demand for transmission rights in the absence of merchant 
investment. Only then can the merchant investment projects receive transmission rights 
created by their addition to capacity. Moreover, incremental FTRs require centralized 
allocation of transmission rights and are against the spirit of decentralized market-driven 
decisions (Joskow & Tirole, 2003). 
 Without a well-defined nodal pricing scheme, such a refined point-to-point 
incremental FTR scheme is not possible. This suggests restricting merchant transmission 
investment in Europe and Australia to high voltage DC interconnection between different 
systems (and to leave other types of investment to the regulated Transmission Owner). The 
market-based revenues in Europe and Australia are derived from the link-based differences in 
(spot) prices between the two ends of the line. Merchant transmission investment in Europe 
and Australia should therefore be restricted to network expansion (interconnection) whereas 
in the US merchants are also allowed to invest in network deepening projects to some extent 
if they wish so (c.f. Brunekreeft, 2003). 
Back-of-the-envelope profitability calculations suggest that merchant transmission 
investment is unlikely to be adequate by itself, because the risk premium will be high. At 
best, we are more likely to see a mix of regulated and unregulated lines being developed. 
Hogan (2003) emphasizes the danger of the slippery slope: i.e. the regulatory alternative 
(which gives access to regulated and hence secure revenues) tends to crowd out the 
unregulated alternative. To avoid this Hogan argues for the following sharp distinction: 
socially beneficial but commercially unprofitable projects (large when compared to the 
relevant market) qualify for the regulated option while everything else should be left to the 
market. Littlechild (2004) expresses the same concern following his analysis of a recent 
application of the regulatory test in Australia. 
 Joskow & Tirole (2003) and Joskow (2003, p. 54 ff.) are quite sceptical about market-
based transmission investment and list a number of inefficiencies. These include market 
failures arising from investment lumpiness, market power in generation, improperly defined 
(non-contingent) property rights, and network effects. Joskow & Tirole conclude that 
merchant line investments are likely to be inefficient if a split in ownership (TO) and 
operation (SO) of transmission lines results in governance problems and incentive 
asymmetries with regard to dispatch and maintenance. 
Two further problems follow from the perception that the European market design is 
still evolving. First, merchant investments may lock in the current situation (decentralized 
power exchanges) and may make changes to future regulatory intervention difficult. This is a 
                                                 
19
 Sometimes called TCCs. They can be used to define so-called Auction Revenue Rights (ARRs). 
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serious concern given the ongoing discussion about optimal pricing schemes and the expected 
changes of network and generation technology in response to CO2 reduction objectives. If it 
is proposed to change the system of pricing (e.g. from a postage stamp to nodal pricing), then 
merchant investors might object and delay desirable changes. Perhaps the right of conversion 
to a regulated status as in Australia can relieve the problem, although not without some moral 
hazard. Second, without well-defined reference prices at both ends of the new 
interconnection, FTRs are not feasible. Changes to the definition and/or scope of the 
reference prices might either create uncertainty about the ex ante value of such FTRs, or 
again provoke opposition to desirable changes, e.g. towards a more refined nodal system, or 
within a market coupling approach a move towards endogenous zoning. 
 In Australia, investors have the option to be unregulated and rely solely on the price 
differentials between the two nodes or rely on regulated revenues, which partly consist of 
regulated connection charges. In order to qualify for regulated revenues the investment has to 
pass the “regulatory test”. The test is passed if the investment has the highest net present 
value of market benefit with regard to possible alternatives. The main advantage of an 
explicit test is that obvious detrimental investments can be checked. The main disadvantage is 
that it inevitably introduces an arbitrary and bureaucratic element in an otherwise market-
driven environment. Littlechild (2004) is critical of a recent application of the regulatory test 
and subsequent approval of a regulated project in the so-called SNI case in Australia. In a 
recent review, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission raised interesting 
questions concerning the regulatory test (ACCC, 2003). One question concerned the 
alternatives to be examined. First, were new power plants alternatives to new lines? Second, 
the test included modeled projects, “likely to be commissioned”. This seems reasonable but 
opens up gaming possibilities: firms can “model” fake projects.  
The ACCC also questioned the measurement of social costs and benefits. First, new 
lines will in general have an effect on the competitiveness of the generation market on both 
sides of the line. A large part of the impact will be transfers from generators to consumers or 
vice versa (depending on the direction of flows), and the change in deadweight loss arising 
from more intense competition is likely to be very small (as demand elasticities are so small). 
There is a feeling that only to count the direct deadweight loss reduction understates the 
competition effects that should be taken into account in the social cost benefit analysis. For 
example, a more competitive market is likely to induce less “excess entry” and require less 
regulatory intervention (which, as California demonstrates, can be hugely costly). The latter 
argument is partly circular if it is assumed that the regulator also works with social cost 
benefit criteria. Alternatively, weighing consumer interests more heavily than shareholders’ 
reinforced the claim that an unweighted deadweight loss analysis underestimates the 
competition effect. The question of how to measure the effect on and value of increased 
competitiveness remains open. Second, new lines will have network effects. For instance, a 
new line can increase the reliability of the network, but might also require a network upgrade. 
The issue relates strongly to the discussion on deep connection charges above. Defining the 
project to be evaluated then becomes somewhat arbitrary. 
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The jury is still out on whether a regulatory test is workable at all and if not, would a 
tender for constructing and operating the (unregulated) line be a feasible alternative? It will 
be interesting to compare Australian and American (e.g. PJM) experiences. 
 Unregulated merchant transmission investment raises a set of regulatory questions (cf. 
Brunekreeft in this issue). The answers to these question depend strongly on whether the 
institutional background is US-nodal-like or Europe/Australia-zonal-like. Institutionally the 
difference is reflected in the light-handed regulatory framework in Australia (called safe 
harbors) as opposed to the more heavy-handed situation in the US with open season 
auctions, while the regulatory discussion in Europe is ongoing. The issues are reflected in for 
instance the discussion around the merchant project BritNed which aims to interconnect the 
UK and the Netherlands, in which case the regulators should set up a regulatory framework. 
The first question to address is whether there should be ownership restrictions on who 
is entitled to build and operate the line. A regulated private TSO owning an unregulated (and 
connected) merchant line may have incentives to distort dispatch and other investments in the 
network. Should there be a restriction on ownership of the line by dominant generators? The 
Australian safe harbors prescribe a limit of 35% of control of generation capacity on either 
side of the line. As a rule, competitiveness on the generation import market will be increased 
even if the dominant generator owns the line. The argument then is that the competitiveness 
could have been increased even more if a third party owned the line. It is disputable whether 
this justifies an intervention. One is inclined to leave the issue to ad-hoc control by 
competition authorities. However, in many cases competition laws seems poorly equipped to 
avoid new investment by a dominant generator and ex post control of abuse of market power 
is a hazardous task as compared to an ex ante control on market structure.  
The second question to address is the design of the access regime. Should the line 
owner be allowed to participate in using the line or should this be fully separated? Should the 
line owner be free to determine who will be entitled to use the line, or should a non-
discriminatory open-access regime apply? Again, the choice is between light- and heavy-
handed regulation, which depends strongly on the underlying institutional framework. 
Applying insights from the theory on vertical relations, a regulated access regime seems 
redundant if the line revenues are unregulated. The unregulated line owner will normally 
have an incentive to maintain competitive pressure among line users. Application of the 
essential-facilities doctrine in competition law suffices to tackle abuse should it occur. The 
situation changes if the line revenues are regulated, either explicitly or implicitly by a tender 
for capacity. In those cases, an access regime is necessary to avoid leverage of market power. 
Third, should a part of the capacity be reserved for the short-run spot market instead 
of selling all capacity in long-term contracts? To share the risks, merchants are likely to sell 
off long-term contracts, possibly even before making the sunk investment. This may impede 
competition if at a later stage new firms would be excluded from using the line, although 
there is likely to be a short-term capacity market to allow contract holders to balance their 
position. 
Fourth, should there be a provision against capacity withholding? Attractive though a 
must-offer (or, use-it-or-lose-it) rule may be after the investment, prior to the investment 
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such a rule adversely affects the investment decision, which may offset any gains of applying 
the rule. Brunekreeft and Newbery (2004) identify situations, in particular demand 
uncertainty and demand growth, when the adverse effect on investment (ex ante) offsets the 
positive effects on the line use (ex post). In contrast if the incentive to withhold capacity is 
the result of pre-emptive investment, a must-offer provision is more likely to enhance welfare 
the lower fixed investment costs. Overall, especially with high fixed investment costs, it is 
likely that application of a must-offer provision in case of unregulated merchant investment 
decreases social welfare.  
 
5. Incentivizing system operators: Regulatory frameworks and experience 
 
The England and Wales electricity market provides an excellent example of the 
benefits of exposing the TSO (NGC) to an incentive scheme to reduce constraint costs. 
Constraint costs fell from over £200 million per year in the early years of the Pool to about 
£25 million per year after the incentives were introduced. Incentives to reduce congestion 
costs are particularly important in England and Wales, because the entire region is treated as 
a single price area. Hence all transmission constraints have to be resolved by the TSO using 
bilateral contracts. Such a setting allows generators with market power to play the inc-dec 
game (i.e. bidding increments or decrements of generation).20 In the UK transmission 
constraints are rare and mainly caused during maintenance periods. Incentivising the TSO to 
reduce these periods, reduce bottlenecks, and engage in clever contracting to limit the extent 
to which generators can play the inc-dec game is crucial.  
The success of the scheme hinges on the ability of the regulator to expose the TSO to 
incentive schemes, which is only feasible if the TSO has an adequate asset base, typically the 
network, to bear the financial risks involved. The English approach will also require careful 
adaptation before such a scheme can be applied to continental TSOs with strong 
interconnections to neighboring countries. The potential problems can be illustrated by two 
observations. Glachant & Pignon (this issue) argue that the combination of inter-regional 
constraints and redispatch to resolve constraints within regions can create incentives for the 
TSO to distort dispatch from the optimal choice. If less transmission capacity is declared 
available for inter-regional capacity than in many network configurations (e.g. in Sweden) 
some of that capacity can reduce constraints within a region. If a TSO is exposed to some of 
the costs for re-dispatching generation to resolve constraints within regions, then it benefits 
from understating available inter-regional transmission capacity.  
Boucher & Smeers (2003) and Patton (2002) point out another cross-border incentive 
problem. They argue that a TSO in one area may have poor incentives to inform a 
neighboring TSO, or worse, the TSO may even have an incentive to resolve its own problems 
                                                 
20
 For example in California, generators first nominated excessive energy flows so that the system 
operator had to contract, typically with the same generators, to re-dispatch in order to avoid violations 
of transmission constraints. This profitable game is possible because every one is granted unlimited 
access even if transmission rights are scarce. The issue is avoided if scarce transmission capacity is 
either allocated as physical transmission contracts or charged through a nodal pricing mechanism. 
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at the expense of the other TSO (“shifting congestion to the neighbors”). These arguments are 
particularly important for the European market. It seems necessary that any incentive scheme 
within a country takes explicit account of cross-border effects (or is combined with a suitable 
cross-border incentive).  
The theory of the design of a comprehensive and consistent regulatory framework for 
TSOs is not well developed, with the exceptions of Vogelsang (2001), Leautier (2000 and 
2001), Yoon & Ilic (2001). As will be explained further below, NGC ’s incentive mechanism, 
aiming at reducing balancing costs and transmission losses, is a practical attempt of an 
incentive scheme that works reasonably well for improving the efficiency of use of the 
existing assets (transmission and generation). The scheme works by setting a target level, 
with revenue deviations from the target are partly borne by NGC. Caps and collars secure that 
the risks are manageable. Transmission losses can be reduced by transmission expansion and 
upgrades, and so short-run incentive may have favorable long-run effects, but the proper 
design of an incentive scheme that would deliver efficient transmission investments is a 
considerably more challenging task. 
Vogelsang (2001) develops a two-part price cap where the variable part reflects 
congestion charges and the fixed part the fixed network costs. The integrated TSO balances 
the two elements: grid expansion requires investment but lowers congestion and vice versa. 
The integrated TSO will have an incentive to expand capacity if marginal congestion costs 
exceed the costs of expansion. In contrast, if TO and SO are split, it seems natural that the SO 
would be responsible for network operation and congestion and the TO for network 
expansion and maintenance. With a TO/SO split, a grid expansion lowers congestion, which 
are foregone revenues for the SO. Whether or not the TO has sufficient incentives to invest 
depends on the cap. In any case, balancing between congestion costs and grid expansion in 
the case of a TO/SO split seems to be coincidental. The argument is more important for the 
split TO/SO cases in the US than the integrated cases in Europe.   
Note how the regulatory scheme for NGC can be seen as two different baskets: one 
for transmission network use-of-system and one for balancing services use-of-system. 
Following the Vogelsang approach and much in line with most of the price-cap literature one 
might suggest integrating both parts into one basket and have the firm decide on a proper 
balance. However, in the presence of vertically integrated TSOs such an approach seems 
inappropriate. Different tariff structures (e.g. capacity versus energy based) bias the choice of 
generation technologies. Therefore the vertically integrated company will choose a tariff 
structure to support technologies dominated by companies affiliated with the network 
operator, technologies consistent with the current operational paradigm or technologies that 
might allow better reaction to inherently incomplete operational or investment incentives. In 
distribution tariffs this has been a frequent complaint of distributed generation.  
Another way in which the TSO can be motivated to increase the availability of 
capacity is the use Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) as applied in the US. The idea 
would be to issue FTRs corresponding to the capacity that the TSO promises to make 
available. Much on the same line as Contracts for Differences, the TSO would be exposed to 
the additional congestion costs if it delivers less transmission capacity on which he will 
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receive congestion payments than contracted in the FTRs for which he has to pay the nodal 
price difference. The same mechanism ensures that the TSO benefits from providing 
additional capacity. Such a scheme has been proposed for the British gas National 
Transmission System (also now owned by NGT, the owner of NGC). The concept might be 
more difficult in a meshed network, because several sets of FTRs are mutually feasible and it 
is difficult to determine which of these sets to issue. The success or failure of such a scheme 
is likely to depend on the fine details.  
Alternatively, in a setting with a TO/SO split, the SO function might be auctioned off, 
which may introduce some competitive pressure (cf. Demsetz, 1968). Demsetz highlights the 
virtues of franchise bidding for natural monopolies as a substitute to regulation. In response, 
Williamson (1976) is more sceptical, but his critique highlights the problems of selling sunk 
assets (with a longer life than the auctioned period). In particular, if the sale price cannot 
credibly be arranged in advance, a subsequent hold-up may lead to underinvestment 
(Williamson, 1976, p. 87). Since the SO does not own the assets, the Williamson (1976) 
critique does not apply. The main assets are the idiosyncratic skills of staff in the SO-
department, which may not give rise to such problems. An SO/TO split does, however, have 
the disadvantage that the asset-poor SO cannot be exposed to strong incentive schemes 
because it may go bankrupt if revenues become negative if targets are not achieved. 
However, if the cap-and-collar scheme as for NGC works sufficiently well it will reduce this 
risk. Nevertheless, an asset-poor SO can only be exposed to a fraction of constraint costs and 
therefore will not fully internalize these costs in his decision process.  
 The next subsection discuss a sample of issues of the regulatory framework and 
experiences for the TSO NGC in the UK.  The situation in the US is discussed in the paper by 
Joskow in this issue.  
 
5.1 UK: National Grid Company21 planning of new investment and charges 
The foreword of NGC ’s 2003 7-year statement states that the “broad approach to planning 
the future development of the transmission system is to maximize the utilization of the 
existing system” and to “continue to maintain or improve its reliability and availability”. In 
practical terms, investment in the grid concerns not so much new lines, but instead 
incremental reinforcements and upgrades. There are two main determinants of investment: 
supply and demand growth,22 and the need to meet the (regulated) quality standards.23 
Retaining quality requires maintenance and upgrading of the grid. NGC works with three 
criteria: availability, reliability (MWs loss of supply), and quality of service, measured by 
deviations from target voltage and frequency levels. 
                                                 
21
 The NGC documents can be downloaded from NGC’s websites: http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/. 
It should be noted stressed that several issues are currently under revision. 
22
 Cf. Security and quality of supply standard (setting out connection requirements) and NGC’s 7-year 
statement. 
23
 Cf. “Security and quality of supply standard, Report to DG of Ofgem under special condition AA2” 
of the Transmission Licence and the Grid Code. 
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To finance these activities, NGC has two classes of network charges: connection 
charges for the grid connection, and Use-of-System charges. The latter can be subdivided into 
transmission network UoS charges (TNUoS) and Balancing System UoS charges (BSUoS). 
Note that NGC ’s use of the term connection charges is narrow as compared to the use 
elsewhere in this paper, where connection charges includes TNUoS. Connection charges are 
only for costs directly associated with connection of a user at an entry/exit point of the grid. 
NGC ’s (or rather, the regulator, Ofgem’s) approach is relatively shallow and relate mainly to 
the costs of assets which can be attributed directly to a user or a subset of users. Substation 
assets and generation-only-spurs fall under connection assets (as opposed to TNUoS), and 
off-shore connections from wind farms would also be borne by the generator. All else is 
considered TNUoS. Significant new connections will normally have an impact elsewhere in 
the network and may require upgrades. Shallow charging does not attribute these costs to the 
new connection.  
TNUoS charges cover the cost of installing, operating and maintaining the 
transmission system. The charges are regulated by a price-cap mechanism. The system relies 
on the marginal expansion costs for an optimized network (using the Investment Cost Related 
Pricing (ICRP) transport model). The marginal costs of required investment are calculated for 
marginal generation and load increases at each node. The nodes are attributed to the 15 
generator zones and 12 demand zones using weighted averages. An additional term, called 
the Security & Residual Tariff, which is not locationally differentiated, serves to ensure 
adequate revenues. The key elements are that the so-defined charges are differentiated in two 
respects. First, the generator-load split was set at approximately 27:73 in 2003. Second, under 
zonal TNUoS pricing, generators in the north pay high G charges while load face low L 
charges, and conversely in the south, reflecting the excess number of generation capacity in 
the north. 
Finally, the Balancing Service UoS charges cover losses and balancing services, 
where NGC is incentivised to reduce their costs. If NGC beats the target, it can retain 60% of 
the savings, whereas if the balancing costs are higher than the target level it will have to share 
50% of the additional costs up to a cap of plus £60 million and a collar of minus £45 million. 
 
6. Conclusions and future research agenda  
 
LMPs are unlikely to recover fixed network costs and additional charges are required. 
Deep connection charges could cover some of these additional costs if they can be properly 
identified and are mainly required to compensate for the difficulty of reflecting all the other 
attributes of transmission service (particularly reliability) in the nodal prices. Provided these 
signals are accurate, the combination of LMPs and deep connection charges should provide 
efficient generation (and load) locational investment signals. The alternative of zonal charges 
may give reasonable investment signals but is less well suited to efficient network use and 
congestion management. 
Nodal spot pricing is considered to be the most efficient congestion management 
system. It is therefore disappointing if understandable that Europe retains a zonal (often 
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country-wide) approach and (initially at least) seems to prefer co-ordinated explicit auctions 
to the intermediate state of market coupling. At least the policy advisers seem agreed to press 
for as close an approximation to nodal pricing as politically feasible and to aim for a 
transitional system that allows the final step towards nodal pricing to avoid a lock-in to an 
inappropriate intermediate stage. In the meantime, market coupling may be preferred for 
network zones with identifiable single price areas. Provided stepwise increases of the market 
coupling areas offer improvements to both participating areas, this gradual approach seems 
promising, as might be the case in Benelux. 
 Financing new transmission investment in interconnectors remains problematic. First, 
it is not yet clear whether merchant transmission investment is a reliable option, and if so, 
whether it would be preferred to regulated investment. Any assessment depends quite 
strongly on specific cases and on the institutional framework. Notably, the nodal approach in 
the US allows a refined payment scheme with incremental point-to-point FTRs. The zonal 
approaches in Europe and Australia have to rely on link-based spot price differences. This 
suggests that the role of merchant investors could be greater in the US while it should be 
restricted to DC interconnectors in Europe.  
Second, where merchant transmission investment takes place it raises new regulatory 
questions. The regulatory approaches in the US, Australia and Europe are strikingly different. 
Whereas the regulatory framework in the US is relatively stringent, in Australia it is light 
handed, following the link-based zonal approach. In Europe the issue still has to be settled, 
but it seems natural to follow the Australian approach as long as European congestion 
management is zonal. 
 The workshop identified a range of topics meriting future research, and the following 
list is not exhaustive. The welfare benefits of reducing market power by transmission 
investment appear modest if measured in the conventional deadweight loss way as demand is 
very inelastic, but this may seriously underestimate the social benefits. Some concern was 
expressed that a shortage of transmission capacity could panic regulators or politicians in 
taking very expensive actions during crisis periods of high prices, as happened in California. 
Increasing the resilience of the system by possibly some over-investment might reduce the 
risk of expensive and inappropriate responses to high prices. If the benefits from increased 
competition are significant, then it becomes important to compare alternative ways to achieve 
the same result, at perhaps lower cost than “excess” transmission investment. 
 Many of the proposed methods of creating strong price signals also create prices risks 
that need hedging contracts such as FTRs. In addition, FTRs can play an important role in 
ensuring that investments are efficient. Such markets are new and need more study, perhaps 
supplemented by experimental economics tests of FTR auctions. For pricing to achieve its 
full effect, the demand side should be involved, and there are outstanding questions on the 
costs and benefits of real time pricing and demand price responsiveness. In some cases this 
should be almost costless, e.g. for large customers with interval metering, but the benefits 
need further documentation (see Borenstein and Holland, 2004). 
 Incentivizing the TSOs remains an underdeveloped area both in theory and practice. 
The main problem to be avoided is that a TSO benefits from creating congestion. An 
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incentive scheme should reward the TSO for reducing congestion and balancing costs by 
carefully balancing daily operation and network investment. The use of redefined FTRs may 
be helpful here; if successful, this would yet give another reason for moving towards a nodal 
pricing scheme. There is also a clear need for more research on the benefits of incentive-
based regulation of (asset owning) TSOs, compared to alternative models (such as not-for-
profit ISOs for which such incentives may have to be considerably weakened). The relative 
merits of state-owned and private transmission companies also remain largely untested. State 
ownership (as in many EU countries) may make it easier to move towards an integrated 
regional system (as in Nordpool), although  the private NGT in Britain has experienced the 
considerable change brought about by ending the Pool, and is currently involved in 
integrating the English and Scottish systems. More problematic are private vertically 
integrated companies such as RWE, E.On and Electrabel, where private ownership requires 
consensual restructuring, often with substantial compensation. 
 The question of how best to judge the desirability of significant new transmission 
investment in interconnected grids under different TSOs remains empirically and 
institutionally unresolved. Further progress will require TSOs to pool transmission and flow 
data and commission the necessary modeling work, and there are some encouraging signs 
that ETSO is moving in this direction. In this connection the whole question of assessing and 
then charging for off-shore wind, and resolving the deep versus shallow connection charge 
question is becoming urgent. Finally, we need more quantitative assessments of the 
difference between implicit and explicit markets (market coupling vs. auctions) for Europe. 
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Appendix: A neutrality result for allocating grid charges between G and L 
 
The regulator will determine how much revenue the regulated grid can collect, and thus the 
shortfall after receiving any LMP revenue. This revenue will have to be collected from G and L 
in some proportion. The balance between G and L clearly does not matter in a perfectly 
competitive and integrated or isolated market (where the division is the same for all agents), 
provided that the difference between prices at different nodes is preserved (Kattuman, Green and 
Bialek, 2004; Vázquez, Olmos and Pérez-Arriaga, 2002). 
 The natural next question is whether this neutrality result carries over to the case of 
imperfectly competitive generators. Fortunately the answer is yes. To see this, consider a general 
model of imperfect competition, and consider generator i competing with other generators j, 
where the reference price is p and the transmission charge to deliver to demand or load is t. Let 
the fraction paid by G be α, and by L, 1-α. Suppose total demand is Q = Σqj, and the inverse 
demand schedule is H(Q) = p + (1-α)t, which depends on the delivered price including that part 
of the transmission charge paid by L. The generator's problem is to choose qi to maximise 
profits, where the cost of generator i producing qi is Ci(qi), given the conjectural response of 
other generators to his choice: 
The first order conditions w.r.t. qi are 
where the terms dqj / dqi are the conjectured responses of other generators to increased output qi. 
Cournot conjectures would make these all zero, Bertrand would make the sum -1 in the case of 
unconstrained constant cost output, and so on. Now the first term in (1) can be rearranged from 
the inverse demand schedule H(Q) = p + (1-α)t: 
which is independent of the sharing parameter α. It follows that the choices of output qi 
determined by (1) are also independent of the shares of total cost borne by G and L, provided 
that the mechanism for collecting the charge is independent of the level of (nodal) prices. It is 
easy to see that the neutrality result would not hold if θ ≡ t/p, and producers receive p(1-αθ) and 
consumers pay p(1+(1-α)θ), for in that case α would not be eliminated in the first order 
conditions. 
 This result parallels the neutrality result derived by Kay and Keen (1983) for the 
incidence of specific taxes, which is the same whether paid by producer or consumer (in a 
rational and frictionless, but not necessarily perfectly competitive, world). 
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The choice of the “slack bus” in the marginal participation rule 
Vázquez et. al. (2002) point out that the choice of the “slack bus” effectively determines from 
which node the withdrawal (or injection) of 1 MW comes, and hence strongly influences the 
resulting flows. As a consequence the principle of the marginal unit can lead to unreasonable 
results if the marginal value in a line is significant although the “real” flow is negligible 
(Vázquez et. al., 2002). This might appear to make the marginal participation rule arbitrary, but 
Vázquez et. al. (2002) demonstrate that irrespective of the choice of slack bus, if both 
generation and load are exposed to the same locational component, then the net total payment 
for a balanced transmission is not influenced by the choice of the slack bus as follows.  
Let Ai,j, represent the marginal participation sensitivities (by how much flow through line 
j increases in response to an injection of 1 MW at node I, given the choice of the slack bus 
where the withdrawal will be made), and suppose that the costs of each line j to be recovered are 
Cj. Total injection at i is gi and withdrawal is di , so net injection is (gi - di). Suppose the original 
choice of slack bus gives rise to a per MW charge of Ti at node i. They also show that if the 
choice of the slack bus is changed then the effect is to add a fixed term Xj to each line's 
sensitivity factor which is independent of the node. Thus the general case where the slack bus 
(and hence the set of Xj 's) has yet to be determined can be found as follows. The resulting per 
MW charge for net injections at i is T'i (X), where 
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 Ignoring losses, if the system is in balance, then Σk(gk – dk) = 0 and hence Σk Xj (gk – dk) = 
0. Therefore the total charge to the agents at node i is 
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 The effect of changing the slack bus is to change all nodal charges by an additive 
element t per MW. We can immediately deduce from the earlier argument on nodal prices with 
imperfect competition that in a balanced system, the choice of the slack bus (which is equivalent 
to choosing the proportion of the total cost allocated to G and L) will make no difference to the 
nodal prices, even in the presence of imperfect competition. 
 
